In Ard v. Hudson, a beneficiary sued testamentary trustees and executors for breach of fiduciary duty and also sought temporary injunctive relief and also sought a receiver. No. 02-13-00198-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 8727 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth August 20, 2015, no pet. history). The trial court granted a summary judgment for the defendants on the basis of a no-contest clause. The court of appeals held that a breach of a forfeiture clause will be found only when the beneficiary’s or devisee’s actions fall clearly within the express terms of the clause. The court mentioned other precedent where challenging a fiduciary did not trigger a no-contest clause. The defendants agreed with that, but argued that the beneficiary’s requests for temporary and permanent injunctive relief and her motions to suspend her brothers as co-trustees and to appoint a receiver triggered the clause. The court held: “[The] inherent right [to challenge a fiduciary] would be worthless absent the beneficiary’s corresponding inherent right to seek protection during such an ongoing challenge of what is left of his or her share of the estate or trust assets, and any income thereon, that the testator or grantor, as the case may be, intended the beneficiary to have.” Id. The defendants also argued that a condition precedent barred the beneficiary’s claims: “Each benefit conferred herein is made on the condition precedent that the beneficiary shall accept and agree to all provisions of this Will.” Id. The court rejected this argument, holding: “We construe the condition precedent language located within the forfeiture clause to be consistent with the forfeiture clause as a whole.” The court reversed the summary judgment.

INTERESTING NOTE: Courts regularly do not enforce no-contest clauses where the beneficiary does not challenge the will for undue influence or mental capacity. Simply holding a fiduciary to his or her duties will not trigger a no-contest clause. Moreover, the Texas Estates Code section 254.005 codified the common law, which held that clauses will not be enforced where just cause existed for bringing the action and the action was brought in and maintained in good faith. Having said all of that, the existence of a clause still deters litigation. Attorneys have to warn clients that they risk losing assets by bringing claims – no one ever knows exactly what a court or jury will do. For such a clause to have any teeth, a testator should leave some assets to a “black-sheep” relative. Otherwise, there is no risk in the “black-sheep” relative challenging the will.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law