In In re Estate of Chapman, Peoples Bank (the Bank) conducted a non-judicial foreclosure sale of secured real estate owned by an estate and then sued the administrator of the estate in district court due to a deficiency remaining on the note after the foreclosure sale. No. 06-17-00051-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 10478 (Tex. App.—Texarkana November 9, 2017, no pet. history). The Bank obtained a default judgment against the estate and then filed an action in the probate court seeking to remove the administrator and to enforce its claim against certain funds that might be payable to the estate in a separate lawsuit. After a hearing, the probate court ordered that any funds payable to the estate be paid first to the Bank. The administrator appealed, arguing that the Bank did not have standing to intervene in the lawsuit and obtain an order directing payment to itself that should have gone to the estate.

The court of appeals noted that to have standing in probate cases, the Texas Estates Code “requires the person to qualify as an ‘interested person,'” and an “interested person” is “an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim against an estate being administered.” Id. (citing Tex. Est. Code Ann. § 22.018(1)). The Bank asserted that it was an interested person because it was a creditor. The court of appeals described the process that a secured creditor must follow to assert a claim against an estate:

Under the Texas Estates Code, if a secured creditor does not elect to have its claim treated as a matured secured claim within a prescribed time period, the creditor has effectively elected that the claim will be a preferred debt and lien against the property securing the indebtedness “and the claim may not be asserted against other assets of the estate.” Explaining the effect of the predecessor Probate Code provisions, the Texas Supreme Court has explained that, when a secured creditor elects for its claim to be approved as a matured secured claim, upon any sale of the collateral, the creditor’s claim has priority over any other claim, except for claims for funeral and last illness expenses and for the expenses of administering the estate. Further, if the proceeds from the sale of the collateral did not pay off its note, the matured secured claimant can “collect[] the deficiency as an unsecured seventh-class creditor.” However, when the secured creditor elects to have its claim approved as a preferred debt and lien, the creditor has priority over all other claims on sale of the collateral, but the preferred debt and lien claimant “forfeit[s] any possibility of collecting a deficiency from the estate.”

In other words, the Texas Estates Code provides that, when a secured creditor elects to have its claim approved as a preferred debt and lien claim, if the independent executor defaults in the payment of the debt, the secured creditor may look only to its collateral for the satisfaction of any claim it may have against the estate. By foreclosing on the secured real estate, the Bank satisfied any debt or claim against the Chapman estate and did not have a deficiency claim as asserted in its notice of claim and motion to remove the Administrator. Therefore, the Bank’s pleadings do not support its contention that it had a claim against the Chapman estate.

By foreclosing on its collateral, the bank effectively satisfied its claim against the estate, and under Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 403.052 (2014), the bank was forbidden from asserting the claim against any other asset of the estate; by obtaining the deficiency judgment in the district court based on the amount remaining after foreclosure, and seeking to enforce that judgment in the probate court, the bank attempted to do indirectly what the Texas Estates Code forbid it from doing directly. Because neither the bank’s pleadings nor the record showed that it was an interested person, it lacked standing to sue on a deficiency.

Id. (internal citations omitted). The court then held that the deficiency judgment was void:

In this case, the Bank elected to have its claim allowed as a preferred debt and lien against its secured real property, thereby electing to look only to its collateral for the satisfaction of its claim. By foreclosing on its collateral, the Bank effectively satisfied its claim against the estate. Under the Texas Estates Code, the Bank was forbidden from asserting the claim against any other asset of the estate. By obtaining the Deficiency Judgment in the District Court based on the amount remaining after foreclosure, and seeking to enforce that judgment in the Probate Court, the Bank attempted to do indirectly what the Estates Code forbids it from doing directly. Under these circumstances, the Deficiency Judgment is void and does not constitute a claim against the estate.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law