In Wakefield v. Bank of Am., N.A., a borrower stopped paying on her mortgage because she felt she was assisting in a fraud. No. 14-16-00580-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] January 18, 2018, no pet. history). She later sued the lender for breach of fiduciary duty, and the lender filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals discussed the discovery rule in the context of a breach of fiduciary duty claims:

The limitations period for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty is four years. “As a general rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy.” A cause of action “accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of that injury or if all resulting damages have yet to occur.” There is, however, a “very limited exception” to the general rule for determining accrual of the cause of action. “The discovery rule exception defers accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Under the discovery rule, accrual may be deferred if “the nature of the injury incurred is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable.” “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is, by its nature, unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” The issue of when a cause of action accrues is a question of law. And, whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable is a legal question “decided on a categorical rather than case-specific basis; the focus is on whether a type of injury rather than a particular injury was discoverable.”

….

In the context of a fiduciary relationship, “the nature of the injury is presumed to be inherently undiscoverable, although a person owed a fiduciary duty has some responsibility to ascertain when an injury occurs.” The rationale for this presumption is that fiduciaries are presumed to possess superior knowledge, meaning the injured party is presumed to possess less information than the fiduciary. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas has repeatedly “held a fiduciary’s misconduct to be inherently undiscoverable.” If a fiduciary relationship exists, “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is relieved of the responsibility of diligent inquiry into the fiduciary’s conduct.”

Id. The court then addressed whether the mortgage lender owed fiduciary duties to the borrower and held that it did not:

Generally, the relationship between a borrower and a lender does not create a fiduciary duty. “[T]he great weight of authority is that while the relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee is often described as one of trust, technically it is not of a fiduciary character.” “A special relationship does not usually exist between a borrower and lender, and when Texas courts have found one, the findings have rested on extraneous facts and conduct, such as excessive lender control or influence in the borrower’s business activities.” Not every relationship involving a high degree of trust and confidence gives rise to an informal fiduciary duty, and for an informal fiduciary duty to arise in a business transaction, “the relationship must exist prior to, and apart from, the agreement made the basis of the suit.” Wakefield did not allege an informal fiduciary relationship; in her pleadings she based her breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim on her status as “lendee” and did not plead any facts to support the existence of an informal relationship.

Id. After holding that the lender did not owe fiduciary duties, the court held that there was no presumption that the claim was undiscoverable and affirmed the summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law