In Graff v. 2920 Park Grove Venture, Ltd., an executor was sued after selling estate real estate because the executor allegedly sold the property for less than fair market value. No. 05-16-01411-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4266 (Tex. App—Dallas June 13, 2018, no pet. history). Among other claims and arguments, the plaintiff alleged that the executor had no authority to sell the property because the will was silent regarding the authority to sell real property. The court of appeals held that the executor had that authority:

It is undisputed that the will did not expressly state the executor had the authority to sell the estate’s real property. However, under Texas law, independent executors like Hayden have authority to do any act which an ordinary executor may do under an order of the probate court without the need for an order. Where the will contains no restrictive terms upon his authority, an independent executor may incur reasonable expenses in the management of the estate, adjust and pay debts against the estate and for that purpose may sell property of the estate, although the will does not expressly grant that power.

The existence of debts against the estate is sufficient to authorize the independent executor to sell real property. Stanley does not dispute that the estate had certain outstanding debts at the time of the sale. In fact, the summary judgment record reveals at the time Hayden decided to sell the apartment complex, the estate had limited cash and several outstanding debts, including federal estate taxes of over $3 million, a mortgage on the apartment complex, executor’s fees of about $800,000, as well as outstanding attorney’s fees incurred in the administration of the estate. Accordingly, Hayden had authority to sell real property to satisfy the outstanding debts of the estate.

As for his contention with respect to probate court authorization, Stanley argues that because the record does not conclusively establish that Hayden needed to sell the property in order to satisfy the estate’s outstanding debts, Park Grove has not shown the probate court would have authorized the sale. According to Stanley, because he put forth evidence of an alternative way to satisfy the outstanding debt without the sale, Park Grove was not entitled to summary judgment on this rescission claim for lack of authority. However, Stanley cites no cases to support his position. To the contrary, the cases upon which he relies suggest that all that is required to authorize a sale is to show the existence of such facts as would authorize the probate court to order a sale, such as outstanding estate debts.

Id. The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the executor on this claim.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law