Skip to content

Menu

Winstead PC logo
HomeAboutServicesSpeakers BureauSubscribeContact
Search
Close
Latest From Knowledge LibraryTexas Court of AppealsTexas Supreme CourtCases Decided
View All Topics

The Fiduciary Litigator

Court Holds That There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish That Account Beneficiary Designations Were Executed As A Result Of Undue Influence

By David Fowler Johnson on January 12, 2019
Posted in Cases Decided, Texas Court of Appeals

Court Holds That There Was Insufficient Evidence To Establish That Account Beneficiary Designations Were Executed As A Result Of Undue Influence

In Fielding v. Tullos, an administrator of a decedent’s estate brought claims against the decedent’s housekeeper for undue influence and other related claims arising from the execution of new account beneficiary designations for certain accounts holding around $1.7 million dollars. No. 09-17-00203-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7136 (Tex. App.—Beaumont August 30, 2018). The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals first discussed the general concept of undue influence:

The party contesting a will or payable-on-death provision or beneficiary designation based on a claim of undue influence bears the burden of proving undue influence. Undue influence is a form of fraud, and the term describes the wrongful use of influence, such as through force, intimidation, duress, or deception, to cause the execution of a will that is contrary to the testator’s desire for the distribution of his or her property after death. In an undue influence claim, the evidence must show not only the presence of the opportunity to influence, but also that improper influence was exerted on the decedent at the time the beneficiary designation or will was made. Simply because the beneficiary had a close relationship with the decedent or otherwise was present for the execution of an instrument, it does not establish proof of undue influence. A person may request or entreat another person to create a favorable dispositive instrument, but unless the entreaties are shown to be so excessive as to subvert the maker’s will, they do not constitute undue influence that invalidates the will. The contestant must prove the existence and exertion of an influence that subverted or overpowered the testator’s mind when the testator executed the document so that the testator executed the document in a manner that he otherwise would not have executed but for such influence.

….

In Texas, the rules guiding a determination of the existence of undue influence apply substantially alike to wills, deeds, and other instruments. To set aside an instrument based on undue influence, the party claiming undue influence must prove (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) the effective operation of such influence so as to subvert or overpower the mind of the property owner at the time the instrument was executed; and (3) the execution of an instrument that the property owner would not have executed but for such influence.

To satisfy the first element, the party contesting an instrument must show that an undue influence existed and was exerted. The contesting party focuses on facts showing the opportunities for the exertion of the alleged influence, the circumstances of the drafting and execution of the instrument, the existence of a fraudulent motive, and whether the person executing the instrument was habitually under the control of another. The exertion of influence, however, cannot be inferred from opportunity alone, such as might result from taking care of the property owner or seeing to his needs. There must be proof showing both that the influence existed and that it was exerted.

To satisfy the second element, the contesting party must show that the exertion of the influence subverted or overpowered the mind of the property owner at the time he signed the instrument. The focus of this element is on the property owner’s state of mind and evidence relating to his ability to resist or susceptibility to the influence of another, such as mental or physical infirmity. But evidence that a property owner was susceptible to influence or incapable of resisting it does not prove that his free will was in fact overcome when the instrument or act of the owner was made. Likewise, a close relationship or the fact the other party was a caretaker would not be sufficient to show undue influence. Influence is “undue” when the property owner’s volition is destroyed and the resulting instrument expresses the wishes of the one exerting the influence. Undue influence may include force, intimidation, duress, persistent requests or demands, or deceit.

To meet the third element, the contesting party must show that the property owner would not have executed the challenged instrument but for the undue influence. In general, this element focuses on whether the instrument makes an unnatural disposition of property. A disposition may be unnatural, for example, if it excludes a property owner’s natural heirs or favors one heir at the expense of others who ordinarily would receive equal treatment. Even so, the disinheritance of close relatives or loved ones is not necessarily unnatural. A property owner’s preference for one beneficiary over others may be unnatural if the record does not disclose a reasonable basis for the preference or contains proof that calls the preference into question or discredits it.

Id. The plaintiff contended that there was either a formal or informal fiduciary relationship between the decedent and the defendant such that there was a presumption of undue influence that shifted the burden of proof onto the defendant to prove she did not engage in undue influence. The court of appeals discussed the shifting burdens associated with this presumption:

Fielding had the burden of establishing that a fiduciary relationship existed between Tullos and Charles. Once a contestant presents evidence of a fiduciary relationship, a presumption of undue influence may arise and the other party then bears the burden to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. Such a rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of producing evidence to the party against which it operates. Once evidence contradicting the presumption has been offered, the presumption is extinguished. The case then proceeds as if no presumption ever existed…. Assuming without deciding that Tullos owed Charles a fiduciary duty, it would not shift the ultimate burden of proof in the case to Tullos, but it would invoke the application of a rebuttable presumption. Tullos could rebut the presumption by coming forward with evidence showing the fairness of the transaction. If Tullos’s summary judgment evidence contradicted the presumption, the presumption was extinguished. Plaintiff retained the ultimate burden of proof on her claims.

Id.

The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for the defendant:

Both Hargroder and Ridley testified that they observed Charles to be in control of his finances and accounts. By contrast, the heirs could not provide any personal knowledge of Tullos’s alleged undue influence over Charles. Although an opportunity for influence may have existed because of the close relationship between Tullos and Charles and because of the degree of care provided by Tullos, opportunity alone is not sufficient to prove undue influence without evidence of exertion of influence. The record gives no indication of force, intimidation, duress, persistent requests or demands, or deceit by Tullos. Consequently, the trial court would not have erred in concluding that summary judgment evidence offered by Tullos rebutted any presumption of undue influence.

There also was no evidence that Charles would not have designated Tullos as his beneficiary but for the alleged undue influence. Hargroder testified that Charles wished to designate Tullos as his beneficiary in recognition of the care she had provided, and Ridley testified that Charles assured him that he wished to designate Tullos as the beneficiary. The heirs testified that they had little contact with Charles and provided little care for him, including a lack of involvement with Charles during Hurricanes Rita and Ike. As a result, we cannot say that material issues of fact exist on Plaintiff’s claims for undue influence. Even assuming without deciding that a fiduciary relationship existed between Charles and Tullos, and after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we conclude that Tullos was entitled to a summary judgment on the undue influence claim. Tullos established the fairness of the designations and rebutted any presumption of undue influence.

Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the defendant.

 

Tags: account beneficiary designations, burden to prove undue influence, presumption of undue influence, undue influence
Print:
Email this postTweet this postLike this postShare this post on LinkedIn
Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law Review, St. Mary’s Law Journal, South Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law
Read more about David Fowler JohnsonDavid's Linkedin Profile
Show more Show less
Related Posts
Court Affirmed Summary Judgment Order Finding That A Will Should Be Set Aside For Undue Influence
May 19, 2025
Court Held That Non-Attorney Executor Could Not Appeal An Order
May 19, 2025
Court Affirms A Trial Court’s Order Granting A Receiver’s Request To Sell Real Property
April 29, 2025

Winstead PC logo

The Fiduciary Litigator

Austin|Charlotte|Dallas|Fort Worth|Houston|Nashville|New York|San Antonio|The Woodlands
Subscribe to this blog via RSS LinkedIn Twitter
Privacy PolicyDisclaimer

About this Blog

The Fiduciary Litigator provides important legal news, updates on recently decided and pending case precedent, and commentary to directors, officers, managers, in-house counsel, and other legal officers who serve the financial services industry.

Read More...

Categories

Archives

Copyright © 2025, Winstead PC. All Rights Reserved.
Law blog design & platform by LexBlog LexBlog Logo