In Gill v. Grewal, the suit arose out of a failed business venture between old college friends. No. 4:14-CV-2502, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104461 (S. D. Tex. June 15, 2020). Gill and Grewal attended college together in the late 1960s. After falling out of touch with each other for over thirty years, the two reconnected at a wedding. The day after the wedding, Grewal pitched Gill an entrepreneurial venture related to the healthcare industry. The parties then formed Healthema. After a dispute arose, Grewal sued his former friend for breaching fiduciary duties arising from the formation and operation of the business. Gill filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that he did not owe any fiduciary duties to Grewal. The district court granted the summary judgment motion on this issue. The court stated:

Apart from formal fiduciary relationships, Texas courts “also recognize an informal fiduciary duty that arises from ‘a moral, social, domestic or purely personal relationship of trust and confidence.'” That being said, “[i]n order to give full force to contracts, [Texas courts] do not create such a relationship lightly.” “It has long been recognized that not every relationship involving a high degree of trust and confidence rises to the stature of a fiduciary relationship.” “[I]n the context of a business transaction, to impose an informal fiduciary duty, the special relationship of trust and confidence must exist prior to, and apart from, any agreement made the basis of the suit.” “Where the underlying facts are undisputed, determination of the existence, and breach, of fiduciary duties are questions of law, exclusively within the province of the court.”

Here, Grewal contends that he placed “‘complete’ trust in J. Gill based on their history of close friendship, and this high degree of personal trust was the reason he allowed J. Gill and S. Gill to maintain exclusive control over Healthema’s bank account while he was in India.” The extent of the personal relationship between J. Gill and Grewal is summed up in the affidavit by Grewal that accompanied his motion for summary judgment… Summarized, Grewal and J. Gill were college friends who kept in touch for a few years, then fell out of contact for thirty-five years. They reconnected at a wedding, and based upon a number of written contracts, Healthema was launched within two months of the duo reconnecting. J. Gill argues that these facts fall well short of creating a fiduciary duty, especially in light of the Supreme Court of Texas’s statement that it “do[es] not create such a relationship lightly.”

The Court agrees. While we all hope that our old college friends hold us in high regard, few would expect these long-lost friends to make their interests subservient to our own, much less following a thirty-five-year break in communication. Yet “[t]he effect of imposing a fiduciary duty is to require the fiduciary party to place someone else’s interests above its own.” For that reason, the Supreme Court of Texas has declined to “impos[e] a fiduciary duty based on the fact that, for four years, [the parties] were friends and frequent dining partners.” Moreover, “mere subjective trust does not . . . transform arm’s length dealing into a fiduciary relationship.” Therefore, “the fact that [Grewal] [completely] trusted [S. Gill] does not transform their business arrangement into a fiduciary relationship.” For those reasons, the Court also grants J. Gill’s motion for summary judgment on Grewal’s breach of fiduciary duty claims.

Id.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law