In Mittelsted v. Meriwether, the decedent changed his will and beneficiary designations on bank accounts to leave everything to his half-brother. No. 14-21-00755-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 1020 (Tex. App.—Houston February 16, 2023, no pet. history). The decedent’s sisters challenged these transactions for mental incompetence, and the jury found for the sisters. The half-brother appealed.

The court first affirmed the trial court’s admission of certain testimony of an expert medical witness. Although the court did not allow the witness to opine on mental capacity and undue influence, the court did allow the witness to testify about specific conditions. The expert opined:

Dr. Adhia reviewed records and affidavits in addition to interviewing several individuals. The records reviewed included medical records from Jack’s primary care doctor and the medical examiner’s report from Jack’s autopsy. Dr. Adhia explained that, according to those records, Jack had suffered at least one stroke (although his family told Dr. Adhia that Jack had likely had two strokes), had generalized anxiety disorder, and had hypertension. Jack also suffered from chronic alcoholism—which was identified as contributing to his death—and was sedentary and disabled. Jack did not regularly seek medical care and often failed to take prescribed medications, choosing to self-medicate by drinking alcohol instead.

Based on this information, Dr. Adhia opined that Jack was incapable of performing or had difficulty performing basic and instrumental activities of daily living. He described “basic” activities of daily living as “simple” tasks, like toileting, bathing, and walking. “Instrumental” activities are a “higher form” of daily living, like shopping, taking medications, and using transportation. Jack needed both physical and mental assistance with performing tasks, such as cleaning himself and his house, visiting the bank, purchasing alcohol, or communicating with his attorney. Jack was highly dependent on others, specifically Donovan, due to Jack’s medical conditions, psychiatric conditions, and substance use disorder. Jack’s “excessive alcohol intake” impacted his medical condition and his ability to perform activities of daily living, as evidenced by the fact that Jack “was basically in his bed much of the time.”

Id. The court concluded:

Dr. Adhia’s limited testimony regarding the “perfect storm” created by stroke, medications, and alcoholism, was based on his training and experience as a forensic psychiatrist, as well as on the information contained in the records provided to him. The fact that Dr. Adhia did not review every possible record goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility, and did not render it speculative.

Id. The court also addressed the admission of testimony from a lay witness and held that such was not in error.

The court then addressed the decedent’s capacity to execute a will. The court held:

A testator has testamentary capacity when he has sufficient mental ability to understand that he is making a will, and the general nature and extent of his property. He also must know the natural objects of his bounty, the claims upon them, and have sufficient memory to collect in his mind the elements of the business transacted and hold them long enough to form a reasonable judgment about them. In a will contest, the pivotal issue is whether the testator had testamentary capacity on the day the will was executed. However, evidence of the testator’s state of mind at other times can be used to prove his state of mind on the day the will was executed provided the evidence demonstrates a condition affecting his testamentary capacity was persistent and likely present at the time the will was executed. “Incapacity to make a will . . . is a subtle thing, and must be established to a great extent, at least so far as lay witnesses are concerned, by circumstantial evidence.”

Id. The court reviewed the evidence, including the medical expert’s testimony, and held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of incompetence. The court also held that the jury could have reasonably rejected the testimony of the self-interested half-brother and other witnesses at the will signing (the attorney had not questioned the decedent before signing the will). The court concluded:

Considering all the evidence both in support of and against the finding, the jury reasonably could have found that Jack lacked testamentary capacity on February 12, 2019. Several witnesses testified that Jack began to decline mentally at some point in 2018. By the beginning of 2019, Mike felt that Jack was “slipping away.” According to Dr. Adhia, Jack suffered from heart disease, panic disorder, and chronic alcoholism. His stroke likely led to impaired cognition and Jack was unable to do basic daily tasks without assistance. Donovan admitted that Jack’s symptoms “progressed” over time after the stroke. Several witnesses testified that Jack was not of “sound mind” to make major decisions in 2018 and continuing into 2019. When witnesses spoke to Jack in person or over the phone, it was difficult or impossible to engage Jack, who “looped” in his train of thought or was “flat,” with “no affect.” In short, the evidence supports a finding that Jack developed a persistent condition or conditions affecting his testamentary capacity, which were likely present when the will was executed.

Id. The court also addressed the decedent’s capacity to execute account beneficiary designations:

Documents executed by one who lacks sufficient legal or mental capacity may be avoided. To have mental capacity, the person executing the instrument must have had sufficient mind and memory to understand the nature and effect of his act at the time of the document’s execution. Capacity may be assessed by considering such factors as (1) the person’s outward conduct demonstrating an “inward and causing condition,” (2) preexisting external circumstances tending to produce a special mental condition, and (3) the person’s mental condition before or after the relevant point in time from which her mental capacity or incapacity may be inferred.

Id. The held that the evidence that supported the finding of incapacity to execute a will also supported the finding of incapacity to execute the bank documents. The court also referenced testimony from a witness who testified that the decedent did not remember signing any new bank documents. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the contestant.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law