In In re Estate of Martinez, a decedent left a holographic will, and a potential recipient of property under that will offered it for probate and sought a declaration regarding a devise of property. No. 04-22-00708-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1258 (Tex. App.—San Antonio February 21, 2024, no pet.). The trial court granted the declaratory judgment and construed the will as devising two properties; one of the two properties went to the applicant, and the other to the decedent’s son because the decedent had devised it to her second husband, who, in legal terms, predeceased her under the Texas Estates Code. The son appealed.

The son argued the trial court incorrectly applied the law to the holographic will and that the will did not devise the two properties because it used “no testamentary language” as to the properties. The court of appeals noted the standards for construing a will and a holographic will:

A will must be in writing, signed by the testator, and witnessed by two or more people. However, a holographic will, “a will written wholly in the testator’s handwriting[,] is not required to be attested by subscribing witnesses.” An estate administrator with a legal controversy involving the will “may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect to the trust or estate” to, among other things, “ascertain any class of . . . heirs,” and “to determine any question arising in the administration of the trust or estate, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.”

“The cardinal rule of will construction is to ascertain the testator’s intent and to enforce that intent to the extent allowed by law.” “We look to the instrument’s language, considering its provisions as a whole and attempting to harmonize them so as to give effect to the will’s overall intent.” “If the true intent can be ascertained from the language of the instrument, then any particular paragraph of the will which, if considered alone, would indicate a contrary intent, must yield to the intention manifested by the whole instrument.” “[A] holographic will should be liberally construed to effect the testator’s intent.” We construe the words in a holographic will “as a layperson would use them absent evidence that the testator received legal assistance in drafting the will or was otherwise familiar with technical meanings.” Furthermore, a trial court should reject an interpretation which results in the testator’s having “done a useless thing.” “One of the primary presumptions that guides the interpretation of wills is the disfavor of any construction that would render the decedent intestate. ‘The fact that [a testator] left a will implies that [he] did not intend to die intestate.'” “A court must construe a will as a matter of law if it has a clear meaning.” “Whether a will is ambiguous is a question of law for the court.” “A will is ambiguous when it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation or its meaning is simply uncertain.”  If “there is no dispute about the meaning of words used in a will, extrinsic evidence will not be received to show that the testatrix intended something outside of the words used.”

Id. The court then proceeded to review the trial court’s decision on the interpretation of the decedent’s will:

The first page of the will provides Marilyn’s late second husband was “to get everything if I die first to include all my belongings, valuables, jewelry.” It then provides: “I will list what special items to give to who.” Marilyn devised 69 acres in Cambellton, Texas “[e]qually” to Clifton, Desiray, and Desiray’s two siblings. The second page first lists a property located on Peterson Avenue in San Antonio and next to it states: “Desi Lives here.” The will then lists a property located on Kingley Drive in San Antonio and states Marilyn and her second husband “live here.”

Desiray’s counsel explained the listing of the addresses, along with the identifying statements of who lives at each, with the first page statement that Marilyn intended to “list what special items to give to who,” demonstrate Marilyn intended to devise the Peterson and Kingley properties in her will to those persons occupying them. Therefore, the Peterson property would go to Desiray, and the Kingley property was devised to Marilyn’s second husband. But because he, in legal terms, predeceased her and the will did not contain a residuary clause, under the Estates Code Marilyn died intestate as to the Kingley property. And the Kingley property would therefore pass to Marilyn’s sole heir, Clifton. Clifton’s counsel argued Marilyn’s intent to devise the two properties was not as clear when comparing and contrasting the language listing the addresses and names of the resident occupants with the clear division of the 69-acre Campbellton property. The two properties were therefore not devised via the will and under the Estates Code, both properties should pass to Marilyn’s sole heir, Clifton.

…

In reviewing the will’s language, considering its provisions as a whole, and attempting to harmonize them so as to give effect to the testatrix’s intent, it is clear Marilyn intended to devise the property she listed in the will. Marilyn was a layperson and no evidence was presented she “received legal assistance in drafting the will or was otherwise familiar with technical meanings.” Although not a paragon of precision, the will plainly states Marilyn’s second husband was “to get everything if I die first to include all my belongings, valuables, jewelry.” It then provides “I will list what special items to give to who.” Marilyn then listed certain property to be devised by the will. Although she did not state to whom the Peterson and Kingley properties would be devised, she did identify by name who lived at each property. And harmonizing that language with her intent as a whole and according the will a liberal construction, we conclude Marilyn intended to devise the two properties to the named persons occupying them. This interpretation also permits this court to reject an interpretation requiring us to conclude Marilyn did a “useless thing” by listing the properties in the will for no reason at all.

Id.  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.