The court of appeals discussed the finality of probate orders:
[A]ppeals from probate courts involve an exception to the final-judgment rule because multiple final judgments may be rendered on discrete issues before an entire probate proceeding is concluded. Two categories of probate court orders are considered final for purposes of appeal even when they do not dispose of all pending parties and claims. First, if a statute expressly declares that the particular phase of the probate proceedings is final and appealable, that statute controls. Second, in the absence of a statute, the order is final if it disposes of all parties and all issues in “the phase of the proceeding for which it was brought.”
Id. The court of appeals held that the order was an appealable order as it disposed of all parties and all issues for that phase:
In asserting that the September 5, 2019 filing was a will contest that initiated a new phase of the proceeding, Wheatfall relies on Texas Estates Code section 55.001, which provides that any “person interested in an estate may, at any time before the court decides an issue in a [probate] proceeding, file written opposition regarding the issue.” We find pertinent to the proceeding Texas Estates Code section 256.101, which provides:
(a) If, after an application for the probate of a decedent’s will or the appointment of a personal representative for the decedent’s estate has been filed but before the application is heard, an application is filed for the probate of a will of the same decedent that has not previously been presented for probate, the court shall: (1) hear both applications together; and (2) determine: (A) if both applications are for the probate of a will, which will should be admitted to probate, if either, or whether the decedent died intestate; or (B) if only one application is for the probate of a will, whether the will should be admitted to probate or whether the decedent died intestate.
This provision requires that a challenge to the validity of one or more wills be adjudicated in a single proceeding. Here, the record shows that the trial court consolidated Wheatfall’s application for letters of administration, in which Wheatfall alleged that the decedent died intestate, with DeBose’s application to admit the 2009 will to probate. Once joined in the same proceeding, these competing applications established a contest about the validity of the 2009 will. Thus, although Wheatfall’s September 5, 2019 filing may be a “written opposition,” it was not a new “contest.” A will contest is a direct attack on the order admitting a will to probate. Wheatfall filed his opposition before the trial court signed its order admitting the 2009 will to probate.
Wheatfall also asserts that the September 16, 2019 order admitting the 2009 will to probate was not final because in stating that it was not ruling on any objections to the probate of the will asserted after September 4, 2019, the trial court left the September 5, 2019 filing unadjudicated. We disagree… In finding that the 2009 will was valid, the trial court also impliedly rejected any claim of undue influence. Further, the trial court rejected Wheatfall’s claim that the decedent died without a valid will by denying his application for letters of administration, his application for determination of heirship, and his motion for appointment of an attorney ad litem. The language of the trial court’s September 16, 2019 order admitting the 2009 will to probate thus shows that the trial court disposed of Wheatfall’s contest to the validity of the 2009 will, including the issues he raised in his September 5, 2019 filing. Because the September 16, 2019 order admitting the 2009 will to probate disposed of all parties and all issues in “the phase of the proceeding for which it was brought” we conclude that it was a final, appealable judgment.
Id. Because the notice of appeal was filed after the thirty-day deadline, the notice of appeal was untimely and the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction.