In In re In the Estate of Wegenhoft, an applicant filed an application to probate a will, which contained a no-contest clause. No. 14-23-00350-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5352 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2024, no pet. history). Contestants filed their opposition to the will, asserting that the will was executed under undue influence, but they nonsuited their claims on the eve of trial. The trial court permitted the applicant’s claims concerning suitability and enforcement of the no-contest clause to proceed to trial and ultimately rendered judgment in favor of the applicant after a jury trial. The contestants filed an appeal challenging the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment against them when they nonsuited their contest prior to trial.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that it did not have jurisdiction after the nonsuit:

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 provides that a plaintiff may take a nonsuit at any time before introducing all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence… However, rule 162 expressly limits the right to nonsuit an entire cause when the defendant has a claim for affirmative relief pending. A claim for affirmative relief is one “on which the claimant could recover compensation or relief even if the plaintiff abandons his cause of action.” Therefore, while a nonsuit has the effect of terminating a case from the moment the motion is filed, it does not affect the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief…

As a brief recap, Curtis and Cynthia opposed the admission of the 2013 Will and filed a counterapplication to probate the 1989 Will. Carl filed a motion alleging that his siblings violated the no-contest clause and requested a finding that they were unsuitable to serve as executors. He also re-asserted these claims in an amended answer to his siblings’ counterapplication. Before the case proceeded to trial, Curtis and Cynthia filed their notice of nonsuit, thereby abandoning their will contest and counterapplication. Accordingly, the only live pleading remaining was Carl’s application to probate the 2013 Will.

We cannot agree that Carl’s claims asserted in his motion or amended answer survived the nonsuit because his claims did not constitute an independent claim for affirmative relief. Put another way, the nonsuit rendered Carl’s claims moot because his claims were dependent on his siblings’ will contest and counterapplication. Without the contest or counterapplication, Carl could not possibly seek to enforce his claims… Contrary to Gibbons, Carl’s application only requested probate of the 2013 Will and that he be appointed as executor. Carl has not cited (and research has not revealed) any Texas case in which a court retained jurisdiction after a nonsuit over claims asserted in an answer when the claims did not seek affirmative relief. Accordingly, Carl’s claims were extinguished by the nonsuit because he did not have a pending claim for affirmative relief.

Id.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law