In Halderman v. Ivy, the decedent’s will stated: “I give, devise and bequeath my 66.977 acres located on FM 1848 in Freestone County, Texas, including all livestock and farm equipment located thereon to my two children . . . in equal shares; provided, however, if either [of the children] shall predecease me, then her share shall be distributed to the survivor of the two, per capita.” No. 08-24-00070-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 7773 (Tex. App.—El Paso October 31, 2024, no pet. history). The plaintiffs filed a petition asking for a declaratory judgment that a truck, tractor, loader, and hay spear were farm equipment located on the farm at the time of the decedent’s death. The trial court conducted a bench trial at which six witnesses testified, and the dispute centered on the location of the tractor, loader, and hay spear on the day the decedent died. The trial court found that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the equipment was on the property at the time of the decedent’s death.

The court of appeals affirmed. The appellant argued that the finding was contrary to a judicial admission that the equipment was on the property. The court of appeals held that even if there was a judicial admission, it was waived when the appellant allowed contrary evidence to be admitted without objection: “a party relying on a judicial admission . . . must protect the record by objecting to the introduction of controverting evidence and to the submission of any issue bearing on the facts admitted. Here, Ms. Halderman cannot maintain that Ms. Ivy’s attorney’s statements were a judicial admission that the tractor was on the farm on the day Mr. Boyd died, when evidence contrary to the purported admission was heard without objection.” Id.

The court then held that there was conflicting evidence, and that the trial court’s finding was supported by sufficient evidence:

Ms. Halderman did not object to testimony that the tractor was not on the farm the day Mr. Boyd died; therefore, the trial court was left with conflicting evidence. Deputy Leatherman testified that while he confined himself to where Mr. Boyd’s body was found on the farm, he did not recall seeing a tractor. Ms. Ivy testified that the tractor was at the house when Mr. Boyd died. Mr. Rodell testified that sometime after Mr. Boyd died, Ms. Ivy asked him to get the tractor, which was at her house, and move it to his house. On the other hand, Mr. Lathrop testified that he drove by Mr. Boyd’s house once or twice a week and he never saw a John Deere tractor on the property. Ms. Halderman testified she obtained the video taken by Deputy Leatherman and “a yellow wheel” could be seen in the video. However, neither the video nor any screenshots from the video showing “a yellow wheel” were admitted in evidence. After considering and weighing all the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding was not so weak or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Furthermore, we defer to the fact-finder’s credibility determinations and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder, even if we would have reached a different conclusion.

Id.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law