In White v. White, an income beneficiary of a trust was retained to manage ranch property. No. 08-23-00244-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8896 (Tex. App.—El Paso December 19, 2024, no pet.). He later became trustee of the trust and ratified his employment and the employment of several of his family members. Two of his brothers sued him for breach of fiduciary duty and sought damages, removal and other relief. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded relief against the trustee:

Following a jury trial in that case, the trial court issued a Final Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, which, among other things, awarded actual damages “on behalf of the trustee of the Trust” against Jim; awarded exemplary damages to Mac and Beau; removed Jim as trustee and prohibited him from taking any additional action as trustee; and modified the White Trust, dividing it into four “Division Trusts” to be administered by Jim, Mac, Beau, and their sister, Hester Ann White Tyler (only a nominal party in the suit), as trustees of their respective trusts, and giving them the right to partition and sell their interests in the White Trust’s assets, including the ranchlands.

Id. The trial court then entered an order appointing a temporary trustee to manage the trust and effectuate its previous order:

[T]he trial court appointed Susan Combs as “temporary interim trustee” of the Division Trusts, empowering her to, among other things, collect all assets of the Division Trusts, including all interests in the Ranch; liquidate the cattle and pay debts of the Division Trusts owed to a bank in Fort Stockton; invest and reinvest all liquid assets of the Division Trusts; and employ persons reasonably necessary to assist in administering the estates of the Division Trusts. The September 3 Order gave Ms. Combs all the “powers of a fee simple owner” in this role.

Id. The trustee’s children appealed, and the court of appeals ordered that it did not have jurisdiction over the order appointing a temporary interim trustee. The court noted:

In general, a final judgment “disposes of all legal issues between the parties.” Conversely, an interlocutory order “leaves something further to be determined and adjudicated in disposing of the parties and their rights.”

Id. (internal citations omitted). The court held that the order was interim because it contemplated additional court actions, i.e., the appointment of a permanent temporary trustee. The court looked to see if there were any statutes that would permit an appeal of this order via an interlocutory basis. The court reviewed a statute that allowed an appeal from orders appointing a trustee or receiver:

Jim and the Intervenors maintain that the portion of the September 3 Order appointing Ms. Combs as interim trustee is appealable under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(1), which provides: “[a] person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . that . . . appoints a receiver or trustee[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1). As we have previously held, however, the exception to the finality rule in § 51.014(a)(1) only applies in situations in which a trial court has appointed a trustee in the first instance, not when it has appointed a successor trustee or receiver.

Id. The court held that the appointment of the interim trustee could not be considered an original appointment of the new divided trusts because the prevailing siblings had already accepted their appointments: “Here too, we conclude that Ms. Combs cannot be characterized as the “original trustee” of the Division Trusts, as the trial court had previously appointed the siblings. Accordingly, the portion of the order appointing Ms. Combs as temporary interim trustee is not appealable under § 51.014(a)(1).” Id.

Finally, the court reviewed whether the order could be considered a temporary injunction order that was appealable and held that it was not:

Jim and the Intervenors contend the September 3 Order can be characterized as an order granting a temporary injunction, which is appealable under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(4). We do not believe the order can be characterized as such. When we consider whether an order is a temporary injunction and therefore appealable, matters of form do not control over “the nature of the order itself—it is the character and function of an order that determine its classification.” “A temporary injunction’s purpose is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Generally, the status quo to be preserved by a temporary injunction is “the last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy.” “There are two general types of temporary injunctions: a prohibitive injunction, which forbids conduct, and a mandatory injunction, which requires it.”

Jim and the Intervenors maintain that appointing Susan Combs and issuing “other equitable relief” can be characterized as granting a temporary injunction. Because a party may appeal from a portion of an order granting a temporary injunction—even if other provisions in the order do not grant such relief—we must examine both portions to determine § 51.014(a)(4) appealability. We conclude that neither portion of the order can be characterized as a temporary injunction under § 51.014(a)(4).

First, the portion of the order appointing Susan Combs as temporary interim trustee was simply a declaration that Ms. Combs was to serve in that capacity with defined duties, and it did not enjoin her from engaging in any particular conduct, nor did it command her to perform a certain act. Moreover, the order appointing Ms. Combs as temporary interim trustee did not preserve the status quo until a trial could be held. To the contrary, the trial court gave Ms. Combs broad powers to alter the status quo by liquidating and reinvesting assets in her administration of the trusts. The order therefore did not function in any respect as a temporary injunction.

Second, the portion of the September 3 Order granting “other equitable relief,” which terminated the employment of Jim and his family and ordered them to cease living on the Ranch, cannot be characterized as a temporary injunction. Once again, this portion of the order was not directed at preserving the status quo until such time as a trial could be held. Instead, the order altered the status quo by permanently firing the family and causing them to leave the Ranch with no indication that the court intended to hold a trial at some future date regarding whether their employment or residence could be reinstated. We therefore conclude that the September 3 Order did not function—nor was it intended to function—as an order granting a temporary injunction that would be appealable under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(4).

Id. Therefore the court dismissed the appeal of the order appointing a temporary trustee and other equitable relief because it was not a final, appealable order.