In In re Marshall, this case involves two related probate court cases where in one Preston Marshall alleges that Elaine T. Marshall breached her fiduciary duties as trustee of the Harrier and Falcon Trusts by appointing inexperienced co-trustees without notice, and in the second Preston Marshall alleges that Elaine T. Marshall breached her fiduciary duties by executing appointment documents that violated the terms of the trust instruments. No. 14-24-00672-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 1488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] March 6, 2025, original proceeding). The trustee filed a motion to consolidate the two cases, and the trial court denied that motion. The trustee filed a petition for writ of mandamus.

The court of appeals noted that under Rule 174, actions involving a common question of law or fact may be consolidated. The trial court must balance judicial economy and convenience against the risk of prejudice or jury confusion. Consolidation is improper if the parties and issues differ. The court stated:

A trial court has broad but not unlimited discretion to consolidate cases with common issues of law or fact. A trial court may consolidate actions that relate to substantially the same transaction, occurrence, subject matter, or question. “The actions should be so related that the evidence presented will be material, relevant, and admissible in each case.” A trial court may abuse its discretion by “incorrectly resolving the relatedness issue or by consolidating cases when the consolidation results in prejudice to the complaining party.” “The central and primary requirement for consolidation of actions as directed by rule 174(a) is that there must exist common issues of law or fact in both cases.” In deciding whether to consolidate, the trial court must balance the judicial economy and convenience that may be gained by the consolidation against the risk of an unfair outcome because of prejudice or jury confusion. Further, in determining whether to consolidate, the trial court must “exercise a sound and legal discretion within limits created by the circumstances of the particular case” and consider whether the legal rights of the parties will be prejudiced by consolidation. Consolidation is improper “if the parties and issues differ.”

Id.

The appellate court found that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize the commonality of issues and by incorrectly resolving the relatedness of the cases. The appellate court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to vacate its order denying consolidation and to grant the motion to consolidate the two cases.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law