In Hollingsworth v. Swales, Richard C. Harris (R.C.) executed a will in 2017 and a codicil in 2020, which contained an arbitration provision. No. 10-23-00018-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 871 (Tex. App.—Waco February 13, 2025, original proceeding). After R.C.’s death in 2021, his will was admitted to probate. R.C.’s children (the Trustees) filed a suit seeking a declaration construing the will. R.C.’s grandchildren filed a cross-petition seeking a declaration that R.C. only partially exercised his power of appointment over certain trust assets. The Trustees moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the will, but the trial court denied the motion.

The primary legal issue addressed was whether an arbitration provision included in a will can be enforced to require disputes related to the will to be submitted to binding arbitration. The court examined whether beneficiaries who accept benefits under a will are deemed to have assented to the arbitration provision, even though they did not sign the will. The court stated:

The Texas Supreme Court has determined that although an agreement under the TAA need not meet all the formal requirements of a contract, it must be supported by mutual assent. Thus, we first address whether the Will here was supported by the mutual assent required to render it an agreement and the arbitration provision valid. Usually, a party manifests its assent by signing an agreement. However, a Will is a unilateral instrument, and, as such, it becomes enforceable when the promisee, in this case a beneficiary, accepts by actual performance. The requirement of mutuality is met by performance. See id. Thus, the instrument does not become binding until the promisee has performed, or at least partly performed, under the agreement.

It is undisputed that the Grandchildren have already taken benefits under the Will. Thus, they have performed under the Will, and mutuality of the arbitration agreement under the Will has been met. Consequently, the arbitration agreement is valid

Id.

The court also held that the disputes regarding the interpretation of the will, including actions brought by or against trustees, fall within the scope of the arbitration provision:

The Grandchildren claimed in a cross-petition for declaratory judgment that pursuant to the Will, R.C. only partially exercised his general power of appointment over the Survivor’s Trust’s assets and thus, the Grandchildren should receive 1/3 of the trust’s assets. The Children generally denied this claim. The Grandchildren agreed in their response to the motion to compel arbitration that their suit requires the court to construe the Will. As stated previously, the arbitration provision in the Will provides: “…arbitration as provided herein shall be the sole and exclusive remedy for the resolution of any dispute of any kind involving this Will (including any trust established hereunder), including any kind of action brought against the Executor or Trustee for any matter…” It is clear from this provision that the Grandchildren’s suit to construe the Will brought against the Children as trustees comprises “a dispute of any kind involving this Will” and that this suit is an action brought against a “Trustee for any matter.” Thus, the suit is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Id.

The court addressed the issue of whether the existence of an arbitration provision in a will ousts the probate court of its jurisdiction over probate matters, particularly in light of statutory requirements that probate proceedings be heard in a court exercising original probate jurisdiction. The court clarified that arbitration does not dismiss a probate case but stays the proceeding, and the probate court retains authority to confirm arbitration awards and enter corresponding judgments. The court held:

The Grandchildren also contend the arbitration agreement cannot be enforced because the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of this probate dispute. They rely on Estates Code section 32.001 which provides that “[a]ll probate proceedings must be filed and heard in a court exercising original probate jurisdiction.” We disagree with the Grandchildren. The Texas Arbitration Act specifically excludes certain agreements from arbitration… Probate matters are not included in this list. If the Legislature had wanted to exclude probate matters from arbitration, it could have included it in this section. It did not.

The Grandchildren argue that arbitration will oust the probate court of its ability to hear the probate proceeding as they contend the Estates Code requires. However, an arbitration agreement does not dismiss a case filed in the trial court; the proceeding is only stayed. Further, the trial court decides whether to confirm the arbitration award, enters an order, and enters a corresponding judgment conforming to the order. Thus, the trial court discharges its duty in hearing the case. Further, the determination of whether R.C. fully or only partially executed his power of appointment appears to be only a part of the entire probate proceeding. Thus, after the arbitration, the probate proceeding could foreseeably continue in the probate court regarding issues that are not disputed or subject to the arbitration provision in the Will during the normal course of probate.

Id. The court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, compelling arbitration.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law