In Henry v. Henry, the testator, who owned a ranch, died and left a will that devised all her property to her four children in equal shares. No. 02-24-00507-CV, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 5917 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth August 7, 2025, no pet.). Darrell, one of the settlor’s sons, recorded a deed after his mother’s death that purportedly conveyed the entire ranch solely to him. The deed was allegedly executed before the will, but it was not recorded until after the settlor’s death. Darrell claimed the settlor delivered the deed to him in April 2019, but his siblings disputed whether she was physically capable of doing so given her health conditions.

The administrator of the settlor’s estate sued to set the deed aside for fraud, based in part on that theory of forgery. “The term ‘forge’ means: ‘to alter, make, complete, execute, or authenticate any writing so that it purports: (i) to be the act of another who did not authorize that act; (ii) to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case; or (iii) to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.’” Id. (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(a)(1)(A)). A forensic document examiner testified that the pages describing the ranch property were likely not attached to the first page of the disputed deed when the settlor signed it. After recording the deed, Darrell sold 70 acres of the ranch and received $257,151 in profit. The dependent administrator of the settlor’s estate sued Darrell for removal of cloud on title and breach of fiduciary duty.

The trial court found that the property description was not attached to the deed when the settlor signed it, indicating the deed was fraudulent. The court noted that under Texas law, a forged deed is void ab initio and passes no title. The trial court’s judgment declared the deed null and void and ordered removal of the cloud on title.

The estate administrator also alleged that Darrell owed the settlor a fiduciary duty and breached it by recording the deed and selling part of the ranch. The court noted: “There are two types of fiduciary relationships in Texas: (1) a formal fiduciary relationship arising as a matter of law, such as between partners or an attorney and a client; and (2) an informal or confidential fiduciary relationship arising from a moral, social, domestic, or merely personal relationship where one person trusts in and relies upon another.” Id. The court described what was necessary to support an informal fiduciary relationship:

Fiduciary relationships juxtapose trust and dependence on one side with dominance and influence on the other. Whether a confidential relationship exists is “determined from the actualities of the relationship between the persons involved.” “The problem is one of equity,” and the circumstances giving rise to the confidential relationship “are not subject to hard and fast lines.” We consider a variety of factors to determine whether an informal fiduciary relationship exists. A confidential fiduciary relationship may exist where influence has been acquired and abused or where confidence has been reposed and betrayed. A confidential relationship “exists where a special confidence is reposed in another who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of the one reposing confidence.” We also consider whether the person to whom the duty is allegedly owed justifiably relied on the other for support, the person’s physical and mental condition, and evidence of the person’s trust. However, subjective trust alone is not sufficient to establish a confidential relationship. Rather, the trust must be justifiable. In examining whether the plaintiff’s trust is justified, we examine whether she actually relied on the other “for moral, financial, or personal support or guidance.” We examine whether, because of a close or special relationship, the plaintiff was “in fact accustomed to being guided by the judgment or advice” of the other. Another factor is the length and depth of the parties’ relationship, although a long personal relationship alone is insufficient to create a fiduciary relationship. For example, a familial relationship, while considered a factor, does not by itself establish a fiduciary relationship. Fiduciary relationships may arise when the parties have dealt with each other in such a manner for a sufficient period of time that one party is justified in expecting the other to act in her best interest.

Id.

The appellate court found insufficient evidence to establish that a fiduciary relationship existed between Darrell and the settlor, as subjective trust and familial relationship alone are not enough under Texas law. The court stated:

Although this evidence addressed Mozelle’s physical and mental condition, the record is missing evidence of additional circumstances that demonstrate Darrell’s relationship with Mozelle caused her to relax the care and vigilance that she would have ordinarily exercised for her own protection. Moreover, Senter failed to present evidence that Mozelle’s trust in Darrell was justified; that she actually relied upon Darrell for moral, financial, or personal support or guidance; or that they dealt with each other in such a manner that she expected him to act in her best interest. Mozelle may have trusted Darrell to negotiate pipeline easements or perform work on the Ranch, but at best, that evidence merely demonstrated subjective trust. Likewise, the fact that Darrell was one of Mozelle’s children and that he had a good relationship with her does not—absent additional circumstances—give rise to a fiduciary duty. Here, the circumstantial evidence presented at trial does not demonstrate that Mozelle was “accustomed to being guided by the judgment or advice” of Darrell. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and indulging every reasonable inference in its favor, it fails to show that an informal relationship of trust and confidence existed between Mozelle and Darrell.

Id. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s award of damages for breach of fiduciary duty, including disgorgement of profits and exemplary damages, due to the lack of a legally sufficient basis for finding a fiduciary duty.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law