In In re Est. of McCulloch, David McCulloch died August 14, 2022, with a pour-over will leaving all property to the David and Vicki McCulloch Trust. No. 02-25-00036-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 2094 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth March 5, 2026, no pet.). Vicki McCulloch, surviving co-trustee, amended the trust September 1, 2023, revoking distributions to Kevin Wayne McCulloch Trust. Kevin McCulloch is David’s son from first marriage to Linda McCulloch. David’s will named Vicki as independent executor and Timothy and Bradley McCulloch (David’s sons with Vicki) as successor executors. Kevin was not named as successor executor despite being recognized as David’s child. Ten days after Vicki filed the application for probate, Kevin filed an opposition to her appointment. The opposition claims that Vicki has a conflict of interest and also challenged the appointment of David’s other children—Timothy and Bradley—as successor independent co-executors, should Vicki cease or fail to perform the duties. Vicki filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Kevin did not have standing to challenge her appointment. The probate court granted the plea, and Kevin appealed.
The court of appeals first discussed the requirements to have standing:
The Estates Code provides that “[a]n interested person may . . . file an opposition to the application [for letters of administration] in writing.” Thus, to challenge the appointment of an executor (as is done in this case) one must be an interested person as defined by the Texas Estates Code. Under the statute, an “interested person” is “an heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim against an estate being administered.” The Texas Supreme Court has reframed the standing test for an interested person to broadly consider “whether the proponent possesses a pecuniary interest to be benefited and affected by the probate of the will and one which would be materially impaired in the absence of its probate.”
Id.
Kevin claimed that he was an interested person because (1) he was an heir and (2) he had a pecuniary interest in the estate. The court of appeals disagreed:
First, the Texas Estates Code defines “heir” as “a person who is entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution to a part of the estate of a decedent who dies intestate.” It is undisputed that David did not die intestate; therefore, Kevin cannot be an “heir” under Section 22.015 or Section 22.018(1). Second, David’s will bequeaths nothing to Kevin. “The intention of the testator must be determined from the words used in the will, and from those words alone.” The executor merely “stands in the shoes of the decedent,” meaning that an independent executor has “no greater powers, rights, or privileges than the decedent whose estate he or she represents.” Looking at the words of David’s will, no matter who the independent executor is, Kevin has no pecuniary interest in the Estate.
Instead, Kevin claims that he has a pecuniary interest in the Estate through the Trust. However, as Kevin points out—and we have also noted—the First Amendment deprives Kevin of any interest in the Trust. Kevin likewise acknowledges on appeal that to “give him standing to pursue his claims” he would need a “reinstatement of his potential gifts” that were revoked in the First Amendment. But, as we have pointed out, the issue of the validity of the First Amendment was not challenged and is not before this court. Accordingly, as things stand, Kevin does not have a pecuniary interest in the Estate that is affected or benefitted by the probate of David’s will. Thus, we hold that Kevin is not an interested person as defined by the statute and did not have standing to oppose Vicki’s appointment as the independent executor.
Id. The court of appeals affirmed the probate court’s order granting the plea.
