In In the Estate of Wheatfall, after Hugh Wheatfall died in 2018, Isaiah Wheatfall filed for letters of administration in February 2019, claiming intestacy, and Theresa DeBose filed to probate a 2009 will one week later. No. 24-0778, 2026 Tex. LEXIS 121 (Tex. February 13, 2026). On September 5, 2019, Isaiah filed a will contest alleging improper execution, lack of sound mind, and undue influence. On September 16, 2019, the trial court admitted the will to probate but overruled only objections asserted through September 4, 2019. The trial judge later stated his belief that the will contest remained alive after the probate order. Isaiah appealed this order.

On appeal, the issue was whether the trial court’s subsequent order admitting the will to probate and denying the son’s application for letters of administration was a final, appealable judgment disposing of the son’s objections even though the order expressly declined to rule on those objections. The court of appeals held that the order was final and the son did not timely appeal, depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that on its face, the order did not unequivocally dispose of all pending issues when it was signed, and the record confirms that it was not intended to do so. The Court stated:

Probate proceedings are an exception to the general rule that there can be only one final and appealable judgment in a case. In such proceedings, “multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.” We have adopted the following “test” for determining a probate order’s appealability:

If there is an express statute, such as the one for the complete heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.

Id. The Court then discussed whether a motion to admit a will and the contest were different phases of a probate proceeding:

As an initial matter, we note that evaluating what constitutes a “particular phase” of a probate proceeding is less straightforward than it appears. For example, the Estates Code seems to envision that the determination of whether to admit a will to probate and the resolution of a will contest constitute distinct phases, as Section 256.204 specifically authorizes an interested person to contest the validity of a will up to two years after it has been admitted to probate. But the Code also includes provisions applicable to a “contest . . . with respect to an application for the probate of a will,” indicating that a will contest and a probate application can be part of the same “phase.” We acknowledge the regrettable lack of clarity in this area of probate law, which warrants the Court’s attention in the proper case; however, as discussed below, it does not affect the outcome in this one…

We need not decide whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that Wheatfall’s September 5 filing was part of the same “phase” of the proceeding as the parties’ competing applications because, even assuming it was, the trial court’s September 16 order simply did not dispose of all issues in that phase. Under the general one-final-judgment rule, a judgment is final if it either “actually disposes of every pending claim and party” or “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Applying that rule in the probate context, an order is final if it either actually disposes of every party and issue in a particular phase of the proceedings or clearly and unequivocally states that it does so. The September 16 order does neither.

Id.

The Court emphasized that finality requires unequivocal language and actual disposition of all issues. The September 16 order’s express limitation to objections through September 4 created ambiguity about whether later objections were resolved. The Court refused to imply finality where the record and express language called finality into question, consistent with the policy of reaching merits and preserving appellate rights when possible. Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded to consider the merits of Isaiah’s appeal from the November 2022 order dismissing his will contest.