In Leggio v. Florian, the trial court awarded three real estate properties to the wife over an allegation by the husband that all of the properties were his separate property. No. 14-21-00168-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5563 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] August 4, 2022, no pet. history). In the court of appeals, the court noted that “[i]f the trial court mischaracterizes a spouse’s separate property as community property and erroneously awards some of that property to the other spouse, then the trial court’s decree of divorce must normally be reversed in part and the case remanded for a new division of the marital estate, unless no harm has been shown from the erroneous division.” Id. There is a statutory presumption that the properties were community property because they were “possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage.” Id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code § 3.003(a)). The husband had the burden of rebutting the community-property presumption. The court noted:

In LaPree v. LaPree, a wife had three trusts where she was the primary beneficiary. No. 03-20-00465-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 1325 (Tex. App.—Austin February 24, 2022, no pet. history). Upon attaining the age of thirty two, the trusts terminated and the trustee transferred the assets to the wife. The husband and wife then created a revocable trust.

In Moore v. Estate of Moore, a decedent’s wife claimed that she had an interest in an oil and gas lease formerly owned by her deceased husband. No. 07-20-00019-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 6142 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 30, 2021, no pet. history). The decedent’s children were the trustees of a trust that was the residuary beneficiary of the decedent’s will. If the decedent still owned the mineral interests at the time of his death, the trust would inherit that interest. After the decedent died, the wife and the trustees settled their dispute and entered into a settlement agreement that provided: “The Parties agree that each shall keep and own such real and personal property as they currently possess without any challenge of any other party.” Id. Later, the trustees sued the wife, alleging she breached her contractual duty to transfer the mineral interest to the trust, was liable under a theory of money had and received, and breached her fiduciary duties. After a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment for the trustees, and held that the mineral interest belonged to the trust. The wife appealed.

In Estate of Tillotson, an administrator of a decedent’s estate filed a turn over motion to have the decedent’s husband turn over the decedent’s community property interest in certain accounts. No. 05-20-00258-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2097 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 18, 2021, no pet. history). After the trial court granted the motion, the surviving spouse appealed. The court of appeals first held that the administrator had the power to file a motion to seek the partition of community property:

The Estates Code provides that at any time after the first anniversary of the date original letters testamentary or of administration are granted, an executor, administrator, heir, or devisee of a decedent’s estate, by written application filed in the court in which the estate is pending, may request the partition and distribution of the estate. See Est. § 360.001(a). The Estates Code further provides that if an intestate deceased spouse is survived by a child, the deceased spouse’s undivided one-half interest in the community estate passes to the deceased spouse’s children. See id. § 201.003… Accordingly, we conclude Hoyl in her capacity as administratrix could request partition of the community property and that the trial court did not err by granting Hoyl’s request to partition community property.

Id. The court discussed that Estates Code section 360.253(a) allows a surviving spouse to seek a partition, but holds that it does not make that right an exclusive one to the surviving spouse.

In Leland House v. Webb, a husband sued his deceased wife’s executor to quiet title in real estate that she obtained from her aunt. No. 06-19-00054-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 10012 (Tex. App.—Texarkana November 19, 2019, no pet. history). The executor argued that the transfer was not a sale of property, but was a gift. The trial court ruled for the executor, and the husband appealed. The court of appeals first reviewed the law regarding community property and presumptions concerning same:

In general, characterization of property is determined by the time and circumstances of its acquisition, often referred to as the ‘inception of title’ doctrine.” It is presumed that property possessed by spouses during marriage is community property, but this presumption can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that it is the separate property of a spouse. Property a spouse acquires “during marriage by gift, devise, or descent” is separate property.

Id. The court then stated that it was undisputed that the aunt conveyed tracts of land to the wife while she was married to the husband. The court held that the property was presumed to be community property unless clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that it was a gift.

The court then reviewed the deed conveying the property, which stated:

I, ELIZABETH SPRADLEY BAUMAN, . . . for and in consideration of the love and affection which I have for my niece, the Grantee, have GRANTED, SOLD AND CONVEYED, and by these presents do GRANT, SELL AND CONVEY unto DIAN[N]E HOUSE . . . all of the surface (without the present merchantable timber) and mineral estate in the following described real property in Nacogdoches County, Texas, to-wit: . . . “Big Loco Farm” . . . and “Little Farm.”

Id. The husband argued that the deed does not contain the word “gift” or indicate that it is to be the wife’s sole and separate property. The court disagreed: