In Ackers v. Comerica Bank & Trust, N.A., a life-time beneficiary of a trust filed a claim for a declaration regarding whether certain contingent remainder beneficiaries were beneficiaries. No. 21-0233, 2022 Tex. LEXIS 997 (Tex. October 28, 2022)(Busby, J., Concurring). The trial court ruled that the claim was not ripe because the contingent remainder beneficiary class could not be determined until the life-time beneficiary died, which had not occurred. The court of appeals affirmed. The life-time beneficiary then sought Texas Supreme Court review. After briefing on the merits, the life-time beneficiary died, which then terminated the trust. The Court denied the petition for review after this death. However, one of the justices wrote an opinion concurring with the denial due to the death, but explaining that the lower courts incorrectly ruled on the ripeness issue.

The justice stated that the court of appeals’s conclusion on ripeness was “incorrect because it focuses solely on the Heirs’ contingent future interest in a remainder distribution of the ‘corpus of the trust’ upon Larry’s death, while ignoring their present rights as putative contingent remainder beneficiaries prior to the trust’s termination.” Id. “Because those present rights were also in dispute, the contingent nature of the future interests of Larry’s ‘then-living descendants’ does not render this suit unripe.” Id. The justice stated:

Although a contingent interest, by definition, is conditioned on the occurrence of an event that may or may not take place, this does not mean that every suit involving a contingent interest is unripe. Rather, the Trust Code allows “interested person[s]” to sue concerning a trust, and an interest can be “any interest, whether . . . present or future, vested or contingent.” … [T]he “contingent status” of an interest cannot render it insufficient because that conclusion “would essentially undo the [Trust Code’s] express grant of rights to parties with ‘contingent’ interests.” It would make no sense to hold that the Legislature, in enacting the Trust Code, gave trial courts jurisdiction over suits they can never hear because the nature of a contingent beneficiary’s interest renders them categorically unripe. Rather, chapters 111 and 115 of the Trust Code indicate that the mere involvement of contingent interests does not necessarily render a case unripe.

There are good reasons that the Trust Code authorizes contingent beneficiaries to sue: they have present as well as future rights that may be affected by a particular dispute. Among these are the right to sue for an accounting by the trustee and the right to sue to remove a trustee. By sending account statements to the Heirs, Comerica treated them as beneficiaries with present rights. The declaration Larry sought would resolve a real dispute regarding whether the Heirs are in fact beneficiaries with such rights.

A trustee owes fiduciary duties to the trust. One such duty is the duty of loyalty, which obligates the trustee to preserve the confidentiality of trust information. To facilitate a trustee’s compliance with its duties of disclosure as well as confidentiality, it is important that both trustees and beneficiaries have access to the judicial forum provided by the Legislature for resolving any disputes regarding present rights. A declaratory judgment regarding whether Comerica properly treated the Heirs as contingent beneficiaries would “actually resolve” this dispute.

Id.

 

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law