In Est. of Smith, the beneficiaries of an estate filed claims that the decedent was mentally incompetent when she deeded her residence to her grandson and granddaughter-in-law. No. 02-24-00175-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8272 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth November 27, 2024, no pet.). The executor of the estate never raised this claim while the grandson and granddaughter-in-law were married, and in fact accepted payments for the property. Later, the estate beneficiaries filed claims, and the executor filed a motion to resign, which was granted. The grandson and his soon to be ex-wife file a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging that the beneficiaries did not have standing to assert their claim. The trial court granted same and there was an appeal.

The court of appeals discussed standing to assert claims on behalf of an estate:

Generally, only a probate estate’s personal representative—the executor or the administrator—has standing to sue to recover property belonging to the estate. But this general rule has a number of exceptions, which—if applicable—allow heirs to file suit on the estate’s behalf. Here, the parties have identified three potentially applicable exceptions. First, heirs may bring suit if they plead and prove that there is no estate administration pending and none is necessary. Second, heirs may bring suit on the estate’s behalf when the personal representative is unable or unwilling to do so or when the personal representative has a conflict of interest. Third, heirs may bring suit when the estate’s administration is closed.

Id. The court then held that none of these exceptions applied in this case:

Here, Appellants pleaded that they had standing under the first and third exceptions. To establish standing based on either of these exceptions, Appellants must show that the administration of Smith’s estate was no longer pending at the time that they filed suit. But they cannot do so.  Because an independent executor is not required to formally close an independent administration, such administrations are often not formally closed. “In the absence of a formal closing, an independent administration may be considered closed when the facts and circumstances show that all debts and claims against the estate have been paid, the estate’s net assets have been distributed, and there is no need for further administration.” Thus, whether an estate was informally closed turns on whether “the debts of the estate [were] paid and the property distributed such that there was no need for further administration.”

The record reflects that the administration had not been informally closed—and thus remained pending—at the time Appellants filed their lawsuit. Although Avantyr’s inventory reflected that “[n]o claims [we]re due and owing to the [e]state,” it did not state that the estate’s debts had been paid or that the assets had been distributed. Thus, the inventory did not—in and of itself—provide the information necessary to show that the administration had been informally closed. Further, before Appellants filed their lawsuit, Avantyr filed a motion to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent any unknown heirs, and the probate court signed an order appointing an attorney ad litem. Not only did such an appointment suggest that further estate distributions may have been necessary, but it also likely created a future claim against the estate for professional fees. Indeed, as noted, in Avantyr’s application for determination of heirship that he filed contemporaneously with his motion for the appointment of an ad litem attorney, he expressly acknowledged that “an administ[rat]ion of the estate remain[ed] necessary” because “the assets of the [e]state require[d] distribution.” Thus, we conclude that the independent administration was not informally closed at the time that Appellants filed their lawsuit and that, therefore, they lack standing.

Id. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the underlying case.

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Photo of David Fowler Johnson David Fowler Johnson

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary…

[email protected]
817.420.8223

David maintains an active trial and appellate practice and has consistently worked on financial institution litigation matters throughout his career. David is the primary author of the The Fiduciary Litigator blog, which reports on legal cases and issues impacting the fiduciary field in Texas. Read More

David’s financial institution experience includes (but is not limited to): breach of contract, foreclosure litigation, lender liability, receivership and injunction remedies upon default, non-recourse and other real estate lending, class action, RICO actions, usury, various tort causes of action, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and preference and other related claims raised by receivers.

David also has experience in estate and trust disputes including will contests, mental competency issues, undue influence, trust modification/clarification, breach of fiduciary duty and related claims, and accountings. David’s recent trial experience includes:

  • Representing a bank in federal class action suit where trust beneficiaries challenged whether the bank was the authorized trustee of over 220 trusts;
  • Representing a bank in state court regarding claims that it mismanaged oil and gas assets;
  • Representing a bank who filed suit in probate court to modify three trusts to remove a charitable beneficiary that had substantially changed operations;
  • Represented an individual executor of an estate against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting; and
  • Represented an individual trustee against claims raised by a beneficiary for breach of fiduciary duty, mental competence of the settlor, and undue influence.

David is one of twenty attorneys in the state (of the 84,000 licensed) that has the triple Board Certification in Civil Trial Law, Civil Appellate and Personal Injury Trial Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.

Additionally, David is a member of the Civil Trial Law Commission of the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. This commission writes and grades the exam for new applicants for civil trial law certification.

David maintains an active appellate practice, which includes:

  • Appeals from final judgments after pre-trial orders such as summary judgments or after jury trials;
  • Interlocutory appeals dealing with temporary injunctions, arbitration, special appearances, sealing the record, and receiverships;
  • Original proceedings such as seeking and defending against mandamus relief; and
  • Seeking emergency relief staying trial court’s orders pending appeal or mandamus.

For example, David was the lead appellate lawyer in the Texas Supreme Court in In re Weekley Homes, LP, 295 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2009). The Court issued a ground-breaking opinion in favor of David’s client regarding the standards that a trial court should follow in ordering the production of computers in discovery.

David previously taught Appellate Advocacy at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law located in Fort Worth. David is licensed and has practiced in the U.S. Supreme Court; the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Federal Circuits; the Federal District Courts for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Texas; the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas intermediate appellate courts. David also served as an adjunct professor at Baylor University Law School, where he taught products liability and portions of health law. He has authored many legal articles and spoken at numerous legal education courses on both trial and appellate issues. His articles have been cited as authority by the Texas Supreme Court (twice) and the Texas Courts of Appeals located in Waco, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler and Houston (Fourteenth District), and a federal district court in Pennsylvania. David’s articles also have been cited by McDonald and Carlson in their Texas Civil Practice treatise, William v. Dorsaneo in the Texas Litigation Guide, and various authors in the Baylor Law ReviewSt. Mary’s Law JournalSouth Texas Law Review and Tennessee Law Review.

Representative Experience

  • Civil Litigation and Appellate Law